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Abstract
To solve the probability problem of the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics, D.Wallace has presented a formal proof of the Born rule via decision theory,
as proposed by D.Deutsch. The idea is to get subjective probabilities from rational
decisions related to quantum measurements, showing the non-probabilistic parts of the
quantum formalism, plus some rational constraints, ensure the squared modulus of
quantum amplitudes play the role of such probabilities.
We provide a new presentation of Wallace’s proof, reorganized to simplify some
arguments, and analyze it from a formal perspective. Similarities with classical decision
theory are made explicit, to clarify its structure and main ideas. A simpler notation
is used, and details are filled in, making it easier to follow and verify. Some problems
have been identified, and we suggest possible corrections.
1 Introduction
This is the first of a set of articles analyzing the decision theoretic proof of the Born
rule developed by D.Wallace. Here we focus on the formal aspects of deriving his result
from the axioms. In other papers we discuss the more controversial aspects of his work,
such as justifications for the axioms and interpretation of the result.
Despite its success, Quantum Mechanics still has unsolved conceptual problems, re-
garding measurements and the wavefunction collapse. Everettian Quantum Mechanics
[DG73, EI57], or the Many Worlds Interpretation, tries to solve them by rejecting the
Measurement Postulate, and applying the rest of the usual formalism to all systems,
even macroscopic ones. In this theory, the quantum state of an observer, after a mea-
surement, is a superposition of different versions of himself, each correlated to one of
the results. The wavefunction collapse is illusory, due to the fact that each version is
unaware of the others. Though this may seem far-fetched, it follows naturally from
the quantum formalism minus the Measurement Postulate, and actually gives a clearer
description of the measurement process than the usual Copenhagen Interpretation.
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But as this theory solves old problems it creates new ones, such as the probability
problem. It regards a possible disagreement with experiments, which seem to indicate
that quantum measurements are probabilistic, with chances given by the Born rule.
As this rule is removed with the Measurement Postulate, and the rest of the formalism
is deterministic, it is not clear how to explain the observed probabilities.
A possible solution is based on D.Deutsch’s idea [Deu99] of using decision theory,
with its well developed formalism of subjective probabilities, to derive the probabilistic
part of quantum theory from the non-probabilistic one. He tried to show that, if a
rational decision maker is to choose between bets on results of quantum measurements,
quantum symmetries and rationality constraints imply he should decide as if results
were probabilistic and followed the Born rule.
This proposal was met with criticism, leading to increasingly refined arguments,
which culminated in D.Wallace’s formal proof [Wal10, Wal12]. Critics remain uncon-
vinced, questioning some axioms or the meaning of his result, but there has been, so
far, no criticism of the proof itself. And while supporters have proposed variations
on Wallace’s ideas, no attempts have been made to improve and clarify his formal
presentation.
Perhaps a reason for this is that his proof is hard to follow. Though he precedes it
with an informal presentation, at times it seems to have little relation with the formal
part. Also, a multilayered notation and terminology makes it hard to keep track of all
formal details, while a number of typos, imprecisions and missing details can lead a
reader astray. Combine that with the unfamiliar mix of quantum and decision theories,
and the result is a maze of concepts and arguments which is arduous to navigate. This
in turn makes the proof hard to verify, and the meaning of its result difficult to grasp.
In this article we give a new presentation of the proof, which, though following the
same general lines as Wallace’s, should be easier to analyze. Its structure was reor-
ganized, allowing some demonstrations to be simplified, and highlighting its parallels
with classical decision theory. Presented in the Appendix, it serves as an introduction
to the ideas in a simpler context. We also identify some problems in Wallace’s proof,
suggesting corrections and improvements.
In section 2 we review the problems of the usual quantum theory, Everett’s proposed
solution, its probability problem, and the decision theoretic approach to solving it.
Section 3 presents Wallace’s quantum decision problem and related concepts, as well
as a glossary of his terminology. His axioms are stated in section 4, which also includes
an analysis of some of them and the concept of nullity. Section 5 brings our presentation
of his proof, with commentaries on its relations with the classical theory, its problems
and possible corrections. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions. In the Appendix we
present classical decision theory, for those unfamiliar with it, as it helps in following
Wallace’s ideas.
2 Preliminaries
We review some problems of the usual quantum theory, which motivated the Everettian
alternative, and then present its main ideas. Its probability problem and some proposed
solutions are discussed, in special the decision theoretic approach, on which Wallace’s
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proof is based.
2.1 The measurement problem and the quantum-classical tran-
sition
In the usual Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (CQM), the Measure-
ment Postulate states that if a system in a state
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci |i〉 , (1)
with 〈i | j〉 = δij and
∑
|ci|2 = 1, is measured with respect to the basis {|i〉}, the result
will be one (and only one) of the i’s, with the state collapsing to the corresponding |i〉.
Also, results are probabilistic, according to the Born rule.
Born Rule. The probability of result i is given by pi = wi, where wi is its Born weight,
wi = |ci|
2 = | 〈i | ψ〉 |2. (2)
This postulate agrees with experimental data, but is conceptually ambiguous. Even
though it sets measurements apart from other quantum processes, which obey the de-
terministic linear Schro¨dinger equation, it lacks a precise definition of what are mea-
surements. These might be distinguished for involving a classical macroscopic system,
like an observer, but if this system’s particles obey Schro¨dinger’s equation, how can
they collectively produce a nonlinear probabilistic process? Which is random in prin-
ciple, not simply due to a lack of knowledge about the states of the particles. And how
does the collapse of the quantum state happen? Many attempts have been made to
solve this measurement problem, such as hidden variables theories, Bohmian mechan-
ics, nonlinear Schro¨dinger equations, and others, each with its own set of difficulties
[Aul00, WZ14].
This relates to the problem of whether Quantum Mechanics remains valid as sys-
tems get larger, with Classical Mechanics emerging from it. In the usual view, quantum
superpositions should not happen at the macroscopic level, lest we observe Schro¨dinger
cats. But nothing in the quantum formalism seems to induce their disappearance in
large systems, quite to the contrary. Some physicists consider Quantum Mechanics
valid only for microscopic systems, with a new theory being needed to explain the
quantum-classical transition. But this point of view becomes problematic as quantum
phenomena are verified at increasingly larger scales, or for research in fields like quan-
tum cosmology. Some see decoherence [JZK+03, Sch07, Zur02] as a possible mechanism
for the emergence of classicality. However, it is questionable whether it really elimi-
nates superpositions, or just wipes out interference between their components, which
remain nonetheless.
2.2 Everettian quantum mechanics
H.Everett III’s proposed solution [EI57, DG73] is to eliminate the Measurement Pos-
tulate, and apply the rest of the quantum formalism even to macroscopic systems. In
this theory, evolution is deterministic at all times, following Schro¨dinger’s equation
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even during measurements. It leads to macroscopic superpositions, but also explains
why observers do not perceive them. If not for some unsolved problems, it might settle
the problem of quantum measurements, and provide the missing link between quantum
and classical mechanics.
In Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM), a measurement is just entanglement of
the measuring device with what is being measured. More precisely, a measuring device
for a basis {|i〉} of a system is any apparatus, in a quantum state |D〉, interacting in
such a way that, if the system is in state |i〉, the composite state evolves as1
|i〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ,
where |Di〉 is a new state of the device, registering result i. Linearity of Schro¨dinger’s
equation implies that, if the system is in state (1), the composite state evolves as
|ψ〉 ⊗ |D〉 =
(∑
i
ci |i〉
)
⊗ |D〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 .
This final state is to be accepted as an actual quantum superposition of macroscopic
states. But it will not be perceived as such by an observer looking at the device, as,
by the same argument, his state |O〉 will evolve into a superposition, according to(∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉
)
⊗ |O〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 ,
with |Oi〉 representing a state in which his brain registers seeing result i. By linearity,
each component |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 evolves independently, as if the others did not exist,
as long as interference is negligible. This condition is usually justified, for macroscopic
systems, using decoherence arguments.
Everett’s interpretation of this final state is that the observer has split into different
versions of himself, each seeing a distinct result. Each version evolves as if the initial
state had been |i〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⊗ |O〉, so he does not feel the splitting, nor the existence of
his other versions. Each component is called a world or a branch, and this evolution
of one world into a superposition of many is called a branching process. So in EQM
all possible results of a measurement actually happen, but in different branches. The
observer in state |Oi〉 only thinks the system has collapsed into |i〉 because he can not
see the whole picture, with all other results and versions of himself.
Many problems plaguing CQM disappear in EQM, but new ones come along. The
preferred basis problem consists in how to decompose a macroscopic quantum state
into branches behaving like the classical reality we observe, with negligible interference
between them. A solution has been proposed by Wallace [Wal12], using an adapta-
tion of the decoherent histories formalism [GMH90, GMH93] to EQM. The probability
problem, discussed in the next section, is how to make sense of quantum probabilities
in EQM. Solving them would put EQM in a better theoretical standing than CQM,
and might even reveal some testable difference between them.
1For simplicity, we assume the system remains in state |i〉, but this is not necessary.
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2.3 The probability problem
In EQM, any result i with ci 6= 0 is obtained with certainty when measuring (1), even
if not all versions of the observer see it. The probability problem is reconciling this
with experiments, which indicate results are probabilistic and follow the Born rule.
It has a qualitative aspect, of how probabilities can emerge from a deterministic
theory. In classical mechanics, processes can appear random due to our ignorance
of details, but in EQM one must explain randomness even if the quantum state and
its evolution are perfectly known. Wallace [Wal12] defends a purely operational and
functional definition of probability, attained via decision theory and Bayesian inference.
Other authors [Vai98, Sau10, SC16] argue there is a self-locating uncertainty in the time
after the device measures the system, but before the observer sees the result. In their
view, in this interval branching has already happened, but each version of the observer
is still ignorant about his branch.
There is also the quantitative aspect of accounting for probability values. Everett
[EI57] proved that if a measure is attributed to branches, and is preserved by further
branchings, it equals the Born weights (2). And, as the number of measurements tends
to infinity, the total measure of branches with results deviating from the Born rule
tends to 0. For finite experiments, this means branches with frequencies deviating
beyond a given error have small measure. But this only makes them negligible if Born
weights have a probabilistic interpretation, leading to a circular argument. A similar
idea was proposed by Graham [Gra73], with the same problem. Gleason’s theorem
[Gle57] also implies the Born rule, if the probability of a branch does not depend on
what other branches the decomposition basis has. But until we know how probabilities
can emerge in EQM, we can not be sure they will satisfy the hypotheses of Everett or
Gleason (of course, EQM is invalid if they do not).
Probabilities given by a counting measure, based on the idea that a measurement
with n results produces n branches, might seem most natural for EQM. But they would
disagree with Born’s rule and quantum experiments: after many measurements, any
sequence of results would appear in some branch, but in most branches the frequency
of each result would tend to 1/n, as if all results were equally probable. Anyway, it
might not be possible to count branches. As, in EQM, measurements are no different
than other quantum processes, branchings can happen in all interactions, becoming
a continuous and pervasive phenomenon. As most interactions involve few particles,
many branches would be macroscopically similar, and a coarse-graining might reduce
and stabilize their number. But it would be somewhat arbitrary, depending on the
chosen fineness of grain.
Other attempts [AL88, BHZ06, Han03, Zur05] have been made to explain why, in an
Everettian universe (i.e. one governed by EQM), quantum experiments would appear
probabilistic, with probabilities given by the Born weights. We focus on Deutsch and
Wallace’s use of decision theory.
2.3.1 The decision theoretic approach
Decision theory (see Appendix A) aims to explain how rational (in an axiomatically
defined sense) decisions should be made. In cases of decision under risk, in which there
are multiple possible outcomes, with known probabilities, they follow the Principle
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of Maximization of Expected Utility: choices with a higher expected value for the
utilities of the outcomes are preferable. When probabilities are unknown (decision
under uncertainty), Savage [Sav72] has shown that subjective probabilities can be
obtained in a well defined way, and used to guide decisions via the same principle.
D.Deutsch [Deu99] proposed using this theory to obtain the Born rule from the non-
probabilistic parts of the quantum formalism. The idea is that rational considerations
and quantum symmetries, without any appeal to probabilities, should be enough to
compel a decision maker to choose between bets, regarding the results of quantum
experiments, using the following strategy:
Born Strategy. Decisions follow the Principle of Maximization of Expected Utility,
but with the expected utilities (6) redefined as
EU =
∑
i
wi · u(ri), (3)
where the probabilities pi were replaced by the Born weights (2) wi of the branches
corresponding to each result of the bet.
In other words, he should behave in the same way classical decision makers do in
probabilistic settings, except that Born weights play the role of probabilities.
Critics [Bak07, BCF+00, HP07, Mal08, Pri06] contested Deutsch’s proposal, ex-
pressing concerns about circularity, questioning his assumptions, proposing alternative
decision strategies, or calling into question the meaning of his result. In response, there
were many attempts [Gil05, Gre04, Sau04, Wal03, Wal07] to clarify his ideas, and fi-
nally a formal proof [Wal10, Wal12] by D.Wallace. Many authors [Ass11, CS13, Pol01,
SC16, Wil13] consider this approach promising, and variations have been proposed in
an effort to elucidate the situation. Others [Alb10, Fin09, Jan16, Ken10, Mau14, Pri10]
remain unconvinced, questioning the ideas behind some of Wallace’s axioms, present-
ing examples of other reasonable decision strategies, or refusing to accept that there is
any place for probability in EQM.
But the debate has been focused on Wallace’s informal ideas, and so far there has
been no detailed criticism of his formal axioms and proof, which stand as the strongest
defense of the decision theoretic approach. In this article we intend to fill such gap.
3 Quantum Decision Problem
In Wallace’s latest formalization [Wal10, Wal12] of Deutsch’s ideas, the formal presen-
tation is preceded by an informal one. As our focus here is a formal analysis of the
proof, discussion of ideas behind concepts and axioms will be limited, and we refer to
[Wal12] for further information. The reader is invited to take a look at the Appendix
first, as the classical case is simpler and helps grasping the ideas in the proof.
Wallace defines a quantum decision problem as being specified by:
• A separable Hilbert space H.
• A collection E of closed2 subspaces ofH, with H ∈ E , forming a complete Boolean
2We added this condition, to avoid the possibility of (E⊥)⊥ 6= E, for example.
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algebra under countable operations of conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, and comple-
ment ⊥ (see section 3.1 for definitions). A partition of E ∈ E is defined as a set
of mutually orthogonal elements of E whose disjunction is E.
• A subset M⊂ E such that any E ∈ E has a partition in elements of M.
• A finite3 partition R of H.
• For each E ∈ E , a set UE of unitary operators from E into H.4
We say the problem is rich if all richness axioms (section 4.1) are satisfied.
Wallace describes [Wal12, p.163] such problem as one in which, in an Everettian
universe, a system prepared in some state is to be measured in a given basis. Bets
are available, giving a payoff in each branch, depending on the result in it. And an
Everettian agent (someone who knows EQM governs his Universe, and knows the Born
weights of that state in the given basis) has to decide which bets he prefers.
In this setting, H is the Hilbert space of the total system of interest (including
macroscopic elements, such as the agent, measuring device, payoffs, etc.). As the
evolution of open quantum systems lacks unitarity, which is essential to the proof, H
must also include the environment. In the next sections we briefly describe the meaning
of the other symbols. A detailed analysis of the concepts will be left for another article.
A solution to a quantum decision problem is given by the assignment, for each
state ψ of each M ∈ M, of a preference order ≻ψ on the elements of UM . From it,
the symbols ≺ψ, ∼ψ, <ψ, and 4ψ are defined as usual. To be acceptable, the solution
must satisfy Wallace’s preference axioms (section 4.2), and in such case we call it a
Wallacean solution. Wallace would probably prefer the term rational solution, but we
would rather avoid value-laden labels.
The notation ≻ψ is ambiguous if ψ is in more than one M ∈ M, but there should
be no problem in leaving M implicit. Given M,N ∈ M and U, V ∈ UN , if ψ ∈M and
M ⊂ N the State Supervenience axiom implies U ≻ψ V ⇔ U |M≻ψ V |M .
3.1 Events
An element of E is called an event, and intuitively it is the subspace spanned by all
states satisfying some proposition. For example, we could have an event E spanned by
all states in which a spin measurement resulted up and the agent received $10.
Operators ∧, ∨, ⊥ play in Quantum Logic [BVN36, EGL09] roles similar to the
connectives AND, OR, NOT of Classical Logic. A conjunction ∧iEi is the intersection
of subspaces Ei, a disjunction ∨iEi is the closure of the span of their union, and E⊥
is the orthogonal complement of E. We also write E ⊥ F meaning E and F are
orthogonal, and ∨˙ for disjunctions of orthogonal subspaces.
An important difference between quantum and classical (Boolean) logics is that the
distributive law fails: if Su, Sd and Sh are eigenspaces of spin up, down, and in some
horizontal direction, then Sh ∧ (Su ∨Sd) = Sh but (Sh ∧Su)∨ (Sh ∧Sd) = {0}. So the
requirement that E be a Boolean algebra5 is quite strong, imposing a classical structure
3We added this assumption for simplicity. See section 3.3 for a discussion.
4Wallace includes some requirements, which we placed with the Richness Axioms (section 4.1).
5In [Wal12], Wallace gives, on pp. 152 and 435, good definitions of the Boolean condition. But on pp.
95 and 175 there are imprecise characterizations, which make it seem less restrictive than it actually is.
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on it. For any E,F ∈ E , distributivity implies E = (E ∧F )∨ (E ∧F⊥), so the Boolean
condition requires that events satisfy the following condition:
Orthogonality Condition. The conjunction of two events E,F ∈ E is zero if, and
only if, they are orthogonal, i.e. E ∧ F = {0} ⇔ E ⊥ F.
This implies the orthogonal projection of one event onto another is also an event,
corresponding to their conjunction, i.e. ΠFE = E ∧ F ∈ E .
Given two partitions {Ei} and {Fj} of the same event, {Fj} is a refinement of
{Ei}, and {Ei} is a coarsening of {Fj}, if each Ei admits a partition in terms of Fj ’s.
With the Orthogonality Condition, two partitions of an event always have a common
refinement.
The requirement that E be complete is a technical condition, that every subset of
the algebra has a supremum, necessary for operating with infinitely many elements. It
is not really restrictive, as any Boolean algebra admits a unique completion.
3.2 Macrostates
Elements of M are called macrostates. Wallace says [Wal12, p.164] “the choice of
macrostates is largely fixed by decoherence, although the precise fineness of grain of
the decomposition is underspecified”. It can not be too coarse, so “an agent can be
assumed not to care exactly what the microstate is within a given macrostate”. Also,
“an agent can have no practical control as to what state she gets, within a particular
macrostate, on familiar statistical-mechanics and decoherence grounds” [Wal12, p.170].
The intuitive idea is that a macrostate consists of macroscopically similar quantum
states (how similar is up to coarsenings and refinements). It plays the role of a classical
state, and should result from a solution to the preferred basis problem, which Wallace
believes can be obtained via decoherence. For our formal analysis, it does not matter
how M is formed, as long as the axioms of section 4 are satisfied.
Given a partition of E ∈ E into macrostates Mi ∈ M, a state ψ ∈ E has a
branch decomposition with branches ψi ∈ Mi if ψ =
∑
i ψi. If more than one ψi is
nonzero, we say ψ is a branched state. The Orthogonality Condition implies two branch
decompositions of ψ admit a common refinement. As any E ∈ E has a partition in
macrostates, intuitively events are disjunctions of macrostates satisfying some common
condition, and ψ ∈ E if it is decomposable in branches having such condition.
3.3 Rewards
Elements of R are events called rewards. They “represent payoffs an agent could get”
[Wal12, p.175], and are “. . . a coarse-graining of the macrostate subspaces. . . such that
an agent’s only preference is to which reward subspace she is in” [Wal12, p. 165].
The description of R as a coarse-graining of M indicates that any M ∈ M should
be in some r ∈ R. But Wallace has not formalized such condition, and his example of
M = E [Wal12, p.176], plus the use ofM∧r in the statement of Macrostate Indifference
[Wal12, p.179], suggest otherwise. By the Orthogonality Condition, M = ∨˙r∈RM ∧ r,
so a macrostateM not contained in any r is a disjunction of events from distinct reward
subspaces. This seems to go against his characterizations of macrostates and rewards.
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Our condition that R be finite is just to avoid some technicalities and focus on
the main parts of Wallace’s proof. As his goal is just to show Born weights replace
probabilities in quantum decisions, and not to develop a general-purpose quantum
decision theory, this is not an important loss of generality. In any case, the proof can
be adapted to work with infinitely many rewards, as in Wallace’s original one.
3.4 Acts
Elements of UE are acts available at E ∈ E . Intuitively, an act might represent the
preparation of a quantum state, its measurement, placing a bet, receiving a payoff, or
any other action of interest. In EQM, even macroscopic evolutions (of closed systems)
are described by unitary operators. Availability of an act depends on E, e.g. the act
of deciding a bet might only be available at events in which that bet has been placed.
Given E ∈ E and U ∈ UE , the range U(E) might not be in E , so Wallace uses OU ,
the smallest event containing it (i.e. the intersection of all F ∈ E with U(E) ⊂ F ).
For ψ ∈ E, a partition OU = ∨˙iMi, with Mi ∈ M, gives a branch decomposition of
Uψ in the Mi’s. The Orthogonality Condition implies these are, up to coarsenings or
refinements, the only possible branches resulting from the act.
At a branched state there are many versions of the agent, each acting on his own
branchMi. In EQM their individual acts Ui ∈ UMi are restrictions of some U ∈ U∨˙iMi .
In Wallace’s terminology, they form a compatible act function. Being theMi’s mutually
orthogonal, so must be their images Ui(Mi).
3.5 Notation and Glossary
A source of confusion in Wallace’s text is an inconsistent notation. For example, he
often uses E to represent either an arbitrary event or a macrostate, at times without
telling that it must be the latter. To avoid this, we adopt the convention that:
• ψ, φ, ξ are always used for states (elements of H);
• E, F for events (elements of E);
• M , N for macrostates (elements of M);
• r, s, t for rewards (elements of R);
• U , V , W , X for acts (elements of some UE);
• OU , or O(U), represents the smallest event containing the range of U ;
• ΠE is the orthogonal projector onto E;
• U |F∈ UF is the restriction of U ∈ UE to F ⊂ E, i.e. U |Fψ = Uψ for all ψ ∈ F ;
• 1E is the identity map on E;
• indices i, j run over countable index sets.
Also, his terminology tends to make concepts and results seem simpler than they
really are, while at the same time making it difficult to keep track of all formal details
behind each term. In our presentation, we opted for a more explicit notation and
terminology. To facilitate comparison, we provide a glossary of some of his terms:
• an act U is available at an event E if U ∈ UE ;
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• an event E is available if UE 6= ∅;
• a set of events {Ei} is available if Ei ⊥ Ej for all i 6= j and ∨iEi is available;
• the weight of an event E with respect to a state ψ and an act U is
Wψ(E|U) = ‖ΠEUψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2;
• a reward function is a function w : R→ [0, 1] such that
∑
r∈R
w(r) = 1;
• the (characteristic) reward function of U and ψ is
Rψ,U (r) =Wψ(r|U) = ‖ΠrUψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2;
• f [α], f1[α] and f2[α] are certain reward functions depending on a parameter α;
• an act has rewards in S ⊂ R if its range is a subset of ∨S;
• if u is a real function on S ⊂ R and an act U has rewards in S, the expected
utility of U with respect to ψ and u is
EUψ(U) =
∑
r∈S
Rψ,U (r) · u(r) =
∑
r∈S
‖ΠrUψ‖2
‖ψ‖2
· u(r);
• an utility function is a real function u on some S ⊂ R, given by his Utility
Lemma;
• given a set P = {pi} of positive numbers with
∑
i pi = 1, and a macrostateM in
a reward r, a P-branching of M is some U ∈ UM such that OU ⊂ r and there is
a partition OU = ∨iMi by macrostates with Wψ(Mi|U) = pi for any ψ ∈M ;
• an erasure of states ψ, ψ′ in macrostates M,M ′ contained in the same reward r
is a pair of acts U ∈ UM , U ′ ∈ UM ′ such that OU ,OU ′ ⊂ r and Uψ = U ′ψ′;
• an act function U for an available set of events {Ei} is a function assigning to
each Ei an act U(Ei) ∈ UEi ;
• an act function U is compatible if there is some U ∈ U∨iEi such that U |Ei= U(Ei);
• a state dependent solution to a decision problem is an assignment, for every
available M ∈ M and every ψ ∈ M , of a two-place relation ≻ψ on the acts
available at M ;
• an event E is null for a given state ψ and act U iff, whenever acts V1 and V2 are
identical on the complement of E, V1U ∼ψ V2U .
4 Wallace’s Axioms
Except for a few corrections, and a diferent notation, we present Wallace’s axioms as
stated in [Wal12]. Their meaning and justification will be only briefly discussed, as for
a formal analysis of the proof these are irrelevant. We also do not question them here,
leaving such line of inquiry for another paper.
The axioms are organized in two sets: richness axioms, which are conditions on the
sets UE giving the agent a good selection of acts to consider, and preference axioms,
conditions his preference orders ≻ψ must satisfy.
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4.1 Richness axioms
We include here some conditions which Wallace placed in his definition of UE .
Restriction. Let E,F ∈ E with F ⊂ E. If U ∈ UE then U |F∈ UF .
Composition. Let E ∈ E. If U ∈ UE and V ∈ UOU then V U ∈ UE.
Indolence. Let E ∈ E. If UE 6= ∅ then 1E ∈ UE .
Continuation. Let E ∈ E and U ∈ UE. Then UOU 6= ∅.
Events with UE = ∅ play no role in the problem, so it seems that Indolence and
Continuation can be replaced by a simpler axiom, stating that 1E ∈ UE for all E ∈ E .
Irreversibility. Let E,F ∈ E. If E ⊥ F then OU|E ⊥ OU|F , for any U ∈ UE∨˙F .
We changed Wallace’s statement to include the hypothesis E ⊥ F , without which
the axiom gives absurd results (e.g. if E = F ). We also replaced OU|E ∧OU|F = {0} by
OU|E ⊥ OU|F , which is equivalent (under the Orthogonality Condition), seems more
natural, and is what is needed for the proof.
By unitarity U(E) ⊥ U(F ), so the axiom requires that orthogonality be preserved
when passing to the smallest events containing these ranges. With the Orthogonality
Condition, OU|E ⊥ OU|F means states of U(E) and U(F ) have no common branches,
i.e. components in the same macrostate. So we have a branching structure: as distinct
branches evolve, they can not generate a common subbranch, and do not interfere.
Reward Availability. Given a set {Mi} of mutually orthogonal macrostates6, and
for each i a reward ri ∈ R, there is some U ∈ U∨iMi such that U(Mi) ⊂ ri for all i.
Wallace’s justification for the availability of such reward acts is that he is considering
a “relatively stylized decision problem” and “envelopes of cash can always be given to
people” [Wal12, p.167].
Branching Availability. Let there be given:
• a set {Mi} of mutually orthogonal macrostates, with each Mi in some ri ∈ R;7
• for each i, a nonzero ψi ∈Mi and a set {pij} of positive numbers with
∑
j pij = 1.
Then there is U ∈ U∨iMi such that, for each i,
• U(Mi) ⊂ ri;
• there is a partition OU|Mi = ∨˙j Nij with Nij ∈M and ‖ΠNijUψi‖
2/‖ψi‖2 = pij.
Availability of such branching act is explained by the possibility of preparing and
measuring an arbitrary quantum state [Wal12, p.167].
We note here a small inconsistency in Wallace’s concepts. He defines [Wal12, p.177]
a P-branching for a macrostate M , with Wψ(Mi|U) = ‖ΠMiUψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = pi holding
for all ψ ∈M . But in his axiom he talks about P-branchings of states. In our statement
we require the condition to hold only for the ψi’s, which is enough for the proof.
6Wallace includes the condition U∨iMi 6= ∅, which does not seem to play any role.
7Wallace omits this last condition, which is required by his definition of P-branchings. As discussed in
section 3.3, it is not clear if he assumes that every M ∈ M is in some r ∈ R.
11
Erasure. Let there be given:
• two sets {Mi} and {Ni} of macrostates, such that those in each set are mutually
orthogonal, and, for each i, we have Mi, Ni ⊂ ri for some ri ∈ R;
• for each i, nonzero states ψi ∈Mi and φi ∈ Ni with ‖ψi‖ = ‖φi‖.8
Then there are U ∈ U∨˙iMi and V ∈ U∨˙iNi such that, for each i, U(Mi), V (Ni) ⊂ ri
and Uψi = V φi.
To explain such erasures, Wallace says [Wal12, p.167] the axiom “effectively guar-
antees that an agent can just forget any facts about his situation that don’t concern
things he cares about (i.e. by definition: that don’t concern where in the reward space
he is)”. He describes U and V as taking ψi and φi into an erasure subspace of ri,
“whose states correspond to the agent throwing the preparation system away after
receiving the payoff but without recording the actual result of the measurement”. To
justify why Uψi and V φi are equal, he says that, as the agent “lacks the fine control to
know which act he is performing, all erasures should be counted as available if any are.
It follows that, since for any two such agents all erasures are available, in particular
there will be two erasures available satisfying the axiom” [Wal12, p.167].
Problem Continuity. Let E ∈ E. Then UE is an open subset of the set of unitary
operators from E to H, in the operator norm topology.
Thus, if U is available, so are all acts sufficiently close to it. The justification is
that the agent can not control every microscopic detail of an act.
4.2 Preference axioms
Wallace calls these rationality axioms, but we prefer a more neutral label. In another
paper we will discuss whether they can be seen, like their counterparts in the classical
theory, as mandates of rationality for decision problems.
Ordering. For each M ∈ M and ψ ∈M , ≻ψ is a total order on UM .
This corresponds to Completeness and Transitivity from classical decision theory.
Branching Indifference. Let r ∈ R, M ∈ M with M ⊂ r, ψ ∈ M , and U ∈ UM . If
Uψ ∈ r then U ∼ψ 1M .
Wallace justifies it by saying that “an agent doesn’t care about branching per se:
if a certain operation leaves his future selves in N different macrostates but doesn’t
change any of their rewards, he is indifferent as to whether or not the operation is
performed”, and that “a preference order which is not indifferent to branching per se
would in practice be impossible to act on: branching is uncontrollable and ever-present
in an Everettian universe” [Wal12, p.170].
Note that, despite the name and justification, the statement of the axiom makes no
reference to branching acts. The only condition on U is that it keeps ψ in the same r.
The axiom is used with both branching acts and erasures, in the Equivalence Lemma.
8Wallace omits this last condition, which is needed as his state vectors are not normalized [Wal12, p.176].
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State Supervenience. Let M,M ′ ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , ψ′ ∈ M ′, U, V ∈ UM and U ′, V ′ ∈
UM ′ . If Uψ = U ′ψ′ and V ψ = V ′ψ′ then U ≻ψ V ⇔ U ′ ≻ψ
′
V ′.
So preferences can not depend on the acts or initial states, only on the final ones.
In particular, Uψ = V ψ implies U ∼ψ V .
Solution Continuity. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M and U, V ∈ UM . If U ≻ψ V then
U ′ ≻ψ V ′ for any U ′, V ′ ∈ UM sufficiently close (in the operator norm) to U and V .
The idea is that small perturbations of acts can not alter preferences, as agents can
not distinguish arbitrarily similar acts, nor execute them with microscopic precision.
It is reminiscent of the classical Archimedean Property (Appendix A.2).
Wallace includes two other preference axioms, Macrostate Indifference and Di-
achronic Consistency, and we have added one more, Act Nondegeneracy. These will
be discussed in more detail in the next sections.
4.2.1 Macrostate Indifference
Wallace’s initial description of this axiom is that “an agent doesn’t care what the
microstate is provided it’s within a particular macrostate” [Wal12, p.170]. He justifies
it saying that “an agent can have no practical control as to what state she gets, within
a particular macrostate, on familiar statistical-mechanics and decoherence grounds,
and that we are interested in an agent’s preferences only insofar as they show up
in her actual dispositions to action”. So the idea is that decisions can not depend
on microscopic details, for the agent has no such fine control, and if two states are
different enough to affect his preferences, they should be in distinct macrostates. In
[Wal10, p.238] he even called the axiom Microstate Indifference, which better expresses
the proposed idea.
Although his informal description makes no reference to rewards, they strangely
appear in his formal statement [Wal12, p.179] (in expressions of the formM ∧ r, which
seem odd in light of our discussion in section 3.3):
Macrostate Indifference. Let M,M ′,M1,M2 ∈ M9, ψ ∈ M , ψ′ ∈ M ′, U, V ∈ UM ,
U ′, V ′ ∈ UM ′ , and r1, r2 ∈ R. If OU ,OU ′ ⊂ M1 ∧ r1 and OV ,OV ′ ⊂ M2 ∧ r2, then
U <ψ V ⇔ U ′ <ψ
′
V ′.
IfM =M ′, U = U ′ and V = V ′, we get U <ψ V ⇔ U <ψ
′
V , so preferences do not
depend on the initial microstates inside M (given the other hypotheses). If M = M ′
and ψ = ψ′, we find that different final microstates, in the same subspace of the form
M ∧ r, do not matter either. This seems to agree with the informal description.
But the formal statement is much stronger. Even if ψ and ψ′ are in different
macrostates M and M ′, all that matters for the preferences are the subspaces Mi ∧ ri
to which they are sent. Acts do not matter either, as with ψ = ψ′, M1 = M2,
r1 = r2, U = V
′ and V = U ′ we get that all acts sending ψ into M1 ∧ r1 are equally
preferred. Ultimately, preference between acts, with images in subspaces of the form
M ∧ r (M ∈ M, r ∈ R), is to depend only on such subspaces.
9Wallace does not say M,M ′ ∈ M, but they must, as his preference order is only defined at macrostates.
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Wallace says [Wal12, p.180] the axiom is only used10, with Reward Availability and
Branching Indifference, to prove the Order on Rewards (see section 5) is total. But he
does not explain how, and it seems that extending the equivalence of preferences from
M ∧ r to the whole r would also require State Supervenience. And it might not even
be enough, since not all states of r must be connected by an available U .
Perhaps his idea can be understood by noting that, in his presentation of classic
decision theory [Wal12, p.458], there is another axiom he also calls Macrostate Indif-
ference. But that one, despite the name, makes no reference to macrostates, only to
rewards. It in fact corresponds to replacing Mi ∧ ri in the above statement by just ri,
in which case the Order on Rewards would easily follow.
So it seems that there is a mix up of three different principles under the same name:
an informal one, justified using the concept of macrostate; another, in terms of rewards,
which was not clearly stated but could be used in the proof; and the formal one, which
mixes both but turns out to be neither properly justified nor useful.
Anyway, none of them are really necessary, as we got the Order on Rewards from
the Equivalence Lemma (section 5), which relies only on the other axioms, and did not
use Macrostate Indifference for anything else.
4.2.2 Nullity
The next axiom requires the concept of nullity. Wallace calls [Wal12, p.178] an event
E null for a state ψ and an act U iff, whenever acts V1 and V2 are identical on the
complement of E, V1U ∼ψ V2U . The idea is that the agent at ψ does not care about
what happens to his future (i.e. after U) selves (if any) at E. Wallace intends to prove
this only happens because ΠEUψ = 0, i.e. the agent has no future selves at E.
This may seem like a straitforward adaptation of a similar concept from classical
decision theory (see Appendix A.3), but this quantum version has some subtleties.
First we have to figure out some missing details in the definition.
Acts were defined as unitary operators from subspaces of H into H, which can be
seen as restrictions of operators acting on the whole H. As the domain of V1 and V2
was not given, we might take it to be H. And, as Wallace does not specify a subspace in
which the complement of E is to be taken, it seems it should be H. But then unitarity
makes the condition V1|E⊥ = V2|E⊥ quite restrictive, forcing V1(E) = V2(E). So for
the agent to be indifferent between V1 and V2 both must take E to the same range,
which does not seem to be what Wallace has in mind.
More likely, V1 and V2 are intended to be acts available at OU , and the complement
to be taken with respect to OU . So we adopt the following formal definition:
Definition (Null Event). Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , U ∈ UM , and E ∈ E with E ⊂ OU .
Then E is null for ψ and U if V1U ∼
ψ V2U for any V1, V2 ∈ UOU with V1|E⊥∧OU =
V2|E⊥∧OU .
Wallace claims [Wal12, p.178], without proof, that finite unions of null sets are null,
and subsets of null sets are also null (clearly he means events and disjunctions, instead
10He also mentions it could be used to obtain Branching Indifference, if M = E .
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of sets and unions). So, in formal terms, nullity is to have the following properties, for
any M ∈M, ψ ∈M , U ∈ UM , and E,F ∈ E such that E,F ⊂ OU :
Null Subevent. If E ⊂ F and F is null for ψ and U , then so is E.
Null Disjunction. If E and F are null for ψ and U , then so is E ∨ F .
These have classical counterparts, and the first one is easily proven. The other one
seems intuitive: if the agent does not care about his future selves at E or F , he should
not care about them at E ∨ F either. The classical proof uses the fact that classical
acts (arbitrary functions mapping states to payoffs) at a classical event (a set of states)
and at its complement are independent. It does not adapt to the quantum case, where
acts are unitary maps, and what happens at E is linked to what happens at E⊥. An
attempt at a direct adaptation might be:
Proof (incorrect). Let E and F be null for ψ and U , and let V1, V2 ∈ UOU satisfy
V1|(E∨F )⊥∧OU = V2|(E∨F )⊥∧OU . Without loss of generality, we can assume E ⊥ F ,
and define a new act V at OU by
V (φ) =


V1(φ) if φ ∈ E,
V2(φ) if φ ∈ F,
V1(φ) = V2(φ) if φ ∈ (E ∨ F )⊥ ∧ OU .
As F and E are both null, V1U ∼ψ V U ∼ψ V2U .
The problem with such “proof” is that V might not be in UOU , and not even be
unitary, as this requires V1(E) ⊥ V2(F ), and there is no reason to expect it to hold
for all V1 and V2 as above
11. Wallace would probably argue, using decoherence, that
states of V1(E) and V2(F ) carry records of their distinct pasts, so should be (almost)
orthogonal. But none of his axioms formalize such idea. And a new one, stating that
under some conditions E ⊥ F ⇒ V1(E) ⊥ V2(F ), might conflict with Erasure.
Null Disjunction is only used in the Nullity Lemma, which shows E is null for ψ
and U if, and only if, ΠEUψ = 0. So an alternative is to take this as defining nullity:
Definition (Null Event, alternative). Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈M , U ∈ UM , and E ∈ E such
that E ⊂ OU . We say E is null for ψ and U if ΠEUψ = 0.
As ΠEUψ = 0 means the agent, starting at ψ, will have, after U , no future selves at
E, it seems reasonable to adopt such lack of descendants as a characterization of which
events he should not care about (i.e. are null). The concept of nullity is only needed
for the Diachronic Consistency axiom, whose justification in terms of this alternative
definition seems as good as the original one.
4.2.3 Diachronic Consistency
Wallace’s last axiom “rules out the possibility of a conflict of interest between an agent
and his future selves” [Wal12, p.168]:
11This would become even worse if we had defined nullity using H instead of OU .
15
Diachronic Consistency. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , U ∈ UM and V, V ′ ∈ UOU . Given a
partition OU = ∨˙iMi with Mi ∈M, let φi = ΠMiUψ. Then:
• if V |Mi<
φi V ′|Mi for all i with Mi not null for ψ and U , then V U <
ψ V ′U ;
• if, in addition, V |Mi≻
φi V ′|Mi for at least one such i, then V U ≻
ψ V ′U .
Here we show that this axiom mixes two ideas, one diachronic and the other syn-
chronic. And that the former follows from the other axioms, so this axiom could be
replaced by a simpler one expressing only the second idea.
The diachronic idea corresponds to Wallace’s informal description, that preferences
should not change in the middle of the decision problem. To isolate it, let OU be a
single macrostate M . In such case the axiom can be reduced to the statement that
V ≻Uψ V ′ ⇔ V U ≻ψ V ′U , which could be obtained from State Supervenience.
The synchronic one is, informally, that if V |Mi is preferred, or equivalent, to V
′|Mi
at all branches, then V is preferred, or equivalent, to V ′. But so far we can not write
V ≻Uψ V ′ when Uψ is branched, as Wallace defined ≻ only at macrostates (even
though he mentions it would be an order on acts at events [Wal12, p.166]).
Some new definitions allow us to properly separate the two ideas.
Definition (Accessible States). Let E ∈ E . A φ ∈ E is accessible (from ψ, via U) if
there are M ∈M, ψ ∈M and U ∈ UM such that OU ⊂ E and Uψ = φ.
So a state is accessible if it can be reached from a non-branched state, via some
act. Non-branched states are trivially accessible, and, assuming the decision problem
starts at a macrostate, all states of interest should be accessible. We extend ≻ψ, which
was only defined at non-branched states, to all accessible ones.
Definition (Extended Order). Let φ ∈ E (E ∈ E) be accessible from ψ ∈M (M ∈ M)
via U ∈ UM . For V, V ′ ∈ UE , we write V ≻φ V ′ whenever V U ≻ψ V ′U .
By State Supervenience, ≻φ does not depend on ψ, M or U , and by Ordering it is
a total order. If E ∈ M it coincides with the original order.
We can now state a new axiom, with only the synchronic part of Diachronic
Consistency. We have incorporated our alternative concept of nullity, but it could
be stated in terms of the original one (with small modifications, as we no longer need
some U connecting a macrostate M to E just so we can write the preference order).
Branch Independence. Let E ∈ E, φ ∈ E be accessible, and V, V ′ ∈ UE . Given a
partition E = ∨˙iMi with Mi ∈M, let φi = ΠMiφ. Then:
• if V |Mi<
φi V ′|Mi for all i with φi 6= 0, then V <
φ V ′;
• if, in addition, V |Mi≻
φi V ′|Mi for at least one i with φi 6= 0, then V ≻
φ V ′.
It relates the order at a branched state to preferences at its branches, whenever
all the agent’s versions agree. If, for all of them, the act corresponding to V , via
restriction, is preferred, or equivalent, to that given by V ′, then V is preferred, or
equivalent, to V ′. And the preference is strict if it is so in at least one branch having
a version of the agent. This is a many worlds version of the classical Independence
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axiom (Appendix A.2): preference between V and V ′ is independent of branches in
which they coincide, being determined only by branches in which they differ.
So the new idea introduced by Wallace’s Diachronic Consistency axiom is this
independence, not the diachronic one he described and which was already present in
State Supervenience. But even though our axiom is simpler and could replace his, we
will not adopt it, to facilitate comparison with his original presentation.
4.2.4 Nondegeneracy
In his proof of the Born Rule Theorem, Wallace dismisses the case of all rewards being
equally preferred by saying it renders the theorem trivially true [Wal12, p.188]. That
is correct, as it leads all acts to be equally preferred, so by taking u(r) = 0 for all r we
make all expected utilities equal, obtaining the result trivially.
However, in such case the result would be trivial even if the expected utilities had
been defined as any other weighted average of the utilities, with no reference to the
Born weights. We could even skip the utilities and define EUψ(U) ≡ 0 for all ψ and
U , and the result would still be true for such case.
As Wallace’s purpose is not really to represent preferences via expected utilities,
but rather to relate them to Born weights, a case solved without them is useless. Of
course, one can say this is not the only case, and real life decisions tend to include
strict preferences (in another paper, we will argue this is not so simple). If that is so,
one should not object to an extra axiom, ensuring at least one strict preference:
Act Nondegeneracy. There are M ∈M, ψ ∈M and U, V ∈ UM such that U ≻ψ V .
Later, once we obtain the Order on Rewards, we will translate this into a strict
preference between at least one pair of rewards (Reward Nondegeneracy Lemma).
We note that axiom S5 (Nondegeneracy) of classical decision under uncertainty
(Appendix A.3) is similar to this one, being necessary because part of the goal there
is to obtain subjective probabilities. No such axiom is included in decision under risk
(Appendix A.2), where the probabilities are given.
5 Formal Proof
The proof was reorganized so some demonstrations could be simplified, but the ideas
are essentially the same as in Wallace’s. Parallels with classical decision theory are
indicated, so its structure can be clarified by comparison with Appendix A. Use of
axioms is made explicit, except for Restriction, Composition, Indolence, Continuation,
and Ordering, which are quite simple and ubiquitous. Many details were filled in to
check for problems, and we suggest corrections when these are found.
The first lemma shows preference on bets (represented by acts U1, U2, V1 and V2)
depends only on the norms of projections of the normalized final states (so, on their
Born weights) on reward subspaces. It corresponds, classically, to the assumption,
expressed in (4), that in decisions about lotteries all that matters are the rewards and
their probabilities. In the Everettian case we are to start with no intuitive meaning for
the Born weights, so it takes a few steps to get to the same point.
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Equivalence Lemma. Let M1,M2 ∈ M, ψ1 ∈ M1, ψ2 ∈ M2, U1, V1 ∈ UM1 and
U2, V2 ∈ UM2 . If, for all r ∈ R, ‖ΠrU1ψ1‖/‖ψ1‖ = ‖ΠrU2ψ2‖/‖ψ2‖ and ‖ΠrV1ψ1‖/‖ψ1‖ =
‖ΠrV2ψ2‖/‖ψ2‖, then U1 ≻
ψ1 V1 ⇔ U2 ≻
ψ2 V2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume ‖ψ1‖ = ‖ψ2‖ = 1, with no proba-
bilistic interpretation, just to simplify the notation. We divide the proof in 3 steps:
Step 1) We use branching acts W1 and W2 to split all branches φ1,r,i and φ2,r,j of
U1ψ1 and U2ψ2, in each r, into new ones ξ1,r,i,j and ξ2,r,j,i of equal norms, still in r.
By the Orthogonality Condition, ΠrOU1 = OU1 ∧r and ΠrOU2 = OU2 ∧r. For each
r ∈ R with ΠrU1ψ1 6= 0, take partitions OU1 ∧ r = ∨˙iM1,r,i and OU2 ∧ r = ∨˙jM2,r,j in
macrostates, and let φ1,r,i = ΠM1,r,iU1ψ1 and φ2,r,j = ΠM2,r,jU2ψ2.
For each r, i and j, let pr,i = ‖φ1,r,i‖2/‖ΠrU1ψ1‖2 and qr,j = ‖φ2,r,j‖2/‖ΠrU2ψ2‖2.
By Branching Availability, there is some W1 ∈ UO(U1) such that, for each r and i,
there is a partition O(W1|M1,r,i) = ∨˙j N1,r,i,j ⊂ r with ‖ξ1,r,i,j‖
2 = ‖φ1,r,i‖2 ·qr,j , where
ξ1,r,i,j = ΠN1,r,i,jW1φ1,r,i. Likewise, we get W2 ∈ UO(U2) such that, for each r and j,
there is a partitionO(W2|M2,r,j ) = ∨˙iN2,r,j,i ⊂ r with ‖ξ2,r,j,i‖
2 = pr,i · ‖φ2,r,j‖2, where
ξ2,r,j,i = ΠN2,r,j,iW2φ2,r,j .
As ‖ΠrU1ψ1‖ = ‖ΠrU2ψ2‖, we have
‖ξ1,r,i,j‖ =
‖φ1,r,i‖ · ‖φ2,r,j‖
‖ΠrU2ψ2‖
= ‖ξ2,r,j,i‖.
Step 2) We ensure the N1,r,i,j ’s (resp. N2,r,j,i’s) are mutually orthogonal, and use
erasures X1 and X2 to make U1ψ1 and U2ψ2 end up in the same final state.
By Irreversibility, theO(W1|M1,r,i)’s are mutually orthogonal, as theO(W2|M2,r,j )’s.
Hence OW1 = ∨˙r,i,j N1,r,i,j and OW2 = ∨˙r,j,iN2,r,j,i. Also, ξ1,r,i,j = ΠN1,r,i,jW1U1ψ1,
and ξ2,r,j,i = ΠN2,r,j,iW2U2ψ2.
Erasure gives X1 ∈ UO(W1) and X2 ∈ UO(W2) with X1(N1,r,i,j), X2(N2,r,j,i) ⊂ r and
X1ξ1,r,i,j = X2ξ2,r,j,i. Then X1W1U1ψ1 = X2W2U2ψ2.
Step 3) The agent is indifferent to the W ’s and X ’s, which take the Uψ’s to the
same final state. As a similar procedure can be done to the V ψ’s, and the agent only
cares about the final states, preferences between the U ’s and the V ’s must agree.
By Branching Indifference we haveW1|M1,r,i ∼
φ1,r,i 1M1,r,i ,W2|M2,r,j ∼
φ2,r,i 1M2,r,j ,
X1|N1,r,i,j ∼
ξ1,r,i,j 1N1,r,i,j and X2|N2,r,j,i ∼
ξ2,r,j,i 1N2,r,j,i , so Diachronic Consistency
gives X1W1U1 ∼ψ1 U1 and X2W2U2 ∼ψ2 U2.
Writing U ′1 = X1W1 and U
′
2 = X2W2, we have U
′
1U1 ∼
ψ1 U1 and U
′
2U2 ∼
ψ2 U2, and,
from the 2nd step, U ′1U1ψ1 = U
′
2U2ψ2. Likewise, we get V
′
1 ∈ UO(V1) and V
′
2 ∈ UO(V2)
with V ′1V1 ∼
ψ1 V1, V
′
2V2 ∼
ψ2 V2 and V
′
1V1ψ1 = V
′
2V2ψ2. By State Supervenience
U ′1U1 ≻
ψ1 V ′1V1 ⇔ U
′
2U2 ≻
ψ2 V ′2V2, so Ordering gives U1 ≻
ψ1 V1 ⇔ U2 ≻ψ2 V2.
Remark 1. There is a small problem in this proof, as some pr,i or qr,j could be 0 (in
Wallace’s version [Wal12, p.183], it corresponds to numbers in his Pr sets being 0).
As M1,r,i ⊂ OU1 , there is some ψ
′ ∈ M1 such that ΠM1,r,iU1ψ
′ 6= 0, so intuitively we
might expect that ΠM1,r,iU1ψ1 6= 0, since ψ1 and ψ
′ are in the same macrostate. But
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such idea is not formalized by Wallace’s axioms. A way to deal with this is to allow for
nonnegative instead of positive numbers in Branching Availability (this might require
some care in its physical justification), and to remove the requirement that states be
nonzero in Erasure (the axiom is actually trivial if ψi = φi = 0).
Remark 2. Wallace includes Reward Availability and Macrostate Indifference among
the hypotheses of this lemma [Wal12, p.182], but they do not seem to be used anywhere
in his demonstration (nor in ours).
Corollary 1. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , and U, V ∈ UM . If ‖ΠrUψ‖ = ‖ΠrV ψ‖ for all
r ∈ R then U ∼ψ V .
Definition (Single Reward Acts). Given r ∈ R, a single reward act Vr at E ∈ E is
any Vr ∈ UE such that OVr ⊂ r.
Reward Availability ensures such acts are always available. They give the same
reward in all branches, corresponding to the classical single reward lotteries. Classically,
an order on rewards is obtained by identifying such lotteries and their rewards. The
Equivalence Lemma allows us to do the same here, ensuring the following definition
does not depend on the choice of Vr, Vs,M or ψ.
Definition (Order on Rewards). Given r, s ∈ R, we write r ≻ s whenever Vr ≻ψ Vs
for single reward acts Vr and Vs at some M ∈ M, and some ψ ∈M .
From ≻, the symbols ≺, ∼, <, and 4 are defined as usual. By Reward Availability
and Ordering this is a total order on R. As noted in section 4.2.1, Wallace claims to
obtain it before the lemma, which he uses instead to get an order on reward functions.
As seen in section 4.2.4, he dismisses the case of r ∼ s for all r, s ∈ R by saying it
renders his result trivial. We instead obtain the nondegeneracy of rewards from that
on acts, since the order on rewards is derived from the one on acts.
Reward Nondegeneracy Lemma. There are r, s ∈ R such that r ≻ s.
Proof. Fix s ∈ R, and suppose r ∼ s for all r ∈ R. Act Nondegeneracy gives M ∈M,
ψ ∈ M and U, V ∈ UM such that U ≻ψ V . After partitioning each OU ∧ r (r ∈ R)
into macrostates, we can use Reward Availability to get U ′ ∈ UOU such that OU ′ ⊂ s.
The Order on Rewards and Diachronic Consistency imply U ′U ∼ψ U . Likewise, we
get V ′ ∈ UOV with OV ′ ⊂ s and V
′V ∼ψ V . By Corollary 1, U ′U ∼ψ V ′V , so that
U ∼ψ V , contradicting their choice.
Definition (Extremal Rewards). We fix r0, r1 ∈ R such that r0 ≺ r1 and r0 4 r 4 r1
for all r ∈ R.
Existence of r0 and r1 is assured by the previous lemma and the finiteness of R.
As stated in section 3.3, we assume R is finite just for simplicity, and the proof can
be adapted to work without extremal rewards. But it would require some techni-
cal workarounds which, though usual in the classical theory and present in Wallace’s
original proof, would cloud the main ideas without bringing any relevant gain.
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The next lemma characterizes a Null Event, showing the only way an agent will
not care about an event is if none of his versions are in it. This is the only part of
the proof whose classical parallel is in decision under uncertainty (Appendix A.3). It
comes into play here because, instead of lotteries, Wallace uses a framework of acts
and events, typical of that case.
Nullity Lemma. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈M , U ∈ UM , and E ∈ E such that E ⊂ OU . Then
E is null for ψ and U if, and only if, ΠEUψ = 0.
Proof. If ΠEUψ = 0 then V1|E⊥∧OU = V2|E⊥∧OU implies V1Uψ = V2Uψ, and by State
Supervenience V1U ∼ψ V2U . Hence E is null. The converse consists of 2 steps:
Step 1) We show the nullity of an event E for a state ψ and an act U is solely
determined by the value of ‖ΠEUψ‖/‖ψ‖.
Given any M , ψ, U , E as in the axiom, with Reward Availability we can obtain
V0, V1 ∈ UOU such that OV0 ⊂ r0, V1|E⊥∧OU = V0|E⊥∧OU , and V1(E) ⊂ r1. If E is
null for ψ and U then V1U ∼
ψ V0U , otherwise, the Order on Rewards and Diachronic
Consistency imply V1U ≻ψ V0U .
As the same holds for any other M ′, ψ′, U ′, E′ as above, the Equivalence Lemma
implies that, if ‖ΠEUψ‖/‖ψ‖ = ‖ΠE′U ′ψ′‖/‖ψ′‖, then E and E′ are either both null
or both non null.
Step 2) We show that a null E with ΠEUψ 6= 0 leads to a contradiction.
Suppose there are M , ψ, U , E as in the axiom, with E null for ψ and U but
‖ΠEUψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = w > 0. Taking any n ∈ N with 1/n < w, Branching Availability
gives V ∈ UM and a partition OV =M1∨˙M2∨˙M3 in macrostates with
‖ΠM1V ψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = 1/n, ‖ΠM2V ψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = w − 1/n, ‖ΠM3V ψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = 1− w.
As ‖ΠM1∨˙M2V ψ‖
2 = w, M1∨˙M2 is null for ψ and V . By Null Subevent, so is M1.
Hence whenever ‖ΠEUψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = 1/n, E will be null for ψ and U .
Branching Availability gives W ∈ UM and a partition OW = M1∨˙ . . . ∨˙Mn with
‖ΠMiWψ‖
2 = 1/n for all i. As the Mi’s are null for ψ and W , by Null Disjunction so
is OW . So whenever Uψ ∈ E, E will be null for ψ and U .
Given M ∈ M and ψ ∈ M , M will be null for ψ and 1M . This contradicts the
Order on Rewards, which gives Vr1 ≻
ψ Vr0 for single reward acts Vr0 and Vr1 atM .
Remark 3. This lemma might be invalidated if the problem with Null Disjunction is not
solved. But this might not jeopardize the rest of the proof, if Diachronic Consistency
is accepted with the alternative definition of nullity discussed in section 4.2.2.
We now define a quantum version of the standard lotteries (5). They play in
our presentation a role similar to the reward functions f [α] Wallace defines in his
Dominance Lemma [Wal12, p.185] (in his terminology, with t = r0 and s = r1, our
standard act Uw corresponds to an act whose reward function is f [w]).
Definition (Standard Acts). Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. A standard act of
weight w at ψ is any Uw ∈ UM with ‖Πr1Uwψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = w and ‖Πr0Uwψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 =
1− w.
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By Branching Availability and Reward Availability, these are always available.
The next result corresponds to step 1 in the proof of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
Theorem (Appendix A.2). In Wallace’s original presentation, it is stated in terms of
reward functions f [α] instead of standard acts, but the idea is the same.
Dominance Lemma. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M and w,w′ ∈ [0, 1]. If Uw and Uw′ are
standard acts of weights w and w′ at ψ then w′ > w ⇔ Uw′ ≻ψ Uw.
Proof. If w′ = w then Uw′ ∼
ψ Uw, by Corollary 1.
If w′ > w then, using Branching Availability, we can obtain U ∈ UM and a partition
OU =M1∨˙M2∨˙M3 in macrostates such that
‖ΠM1Uψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = w, ‖ΠM2Uψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = w′ − w, ‖ΠM3Uψ‖
2/‖ψ‖2 = 1− w′.
Reward Availability gives V, V ′ ∈ UOU with
V (M1) ⊂ r1, V (M2) ⊂ r0, V (M3) ⊂ r0,
V ′(M1) ⊂ r1, V
′(M2) ⊂ r1, V
′(M3) ⊂ r0,
so that, by the Order on Rewards,
V ′|M1 ∼
ΠM1Uψ V |M1 , V
′|M2 ≻
ΠM2Uψ V |M2 , V
′|M3 ∼
ΠM3Uψ V |M3 .
By the Nullity Lemma12, M2 is not null for ψ and U , so Diachronic Consistency gives
V ′U ≻ψ V U . By Corollary 1, V ′U ∼ψ Uw′ and V U ∼ψ Uw, so that Uw′ ≻ψ Uw.
The converse follows via Ordering.
The rest of the proof, though based on Wallace’s ideas, is organized in quite a
different way than his, so some arguments could be simplified, and to help clarify its
structure.
The next lemma, corresponding to step 2 in the proof of the Von Neumann-Morgen-
stern Theorem, forms an utility function u(r) by comparing single reward acts Vr with
standard acts Uw. It is similar to Wallace’s Utility Lemma, but differs in the extent to
which it develops properties of u (hence the different name). Part of Wallace’s lemma
was separated into our remaining results, while part of the demonstration of his Born
Rule Theorem was incorporated into this lemma.
Utility Function Lemma. There is an unique13 u : R→ [0, 1] such that:
• u(r0) = 0 and u(r1) = 1;
• for any r ∈ R, M ∈ M and ψ ∈ M , we have Vr ∼ψ Uu(r), where Vr is a single
reward act at M , and Uu(r) is a standard act of weight u(r) at ψ.
Moreover, u(r) > u(s)⇔ r ≻ s.
12Or our alternative definition of nullity.
13Other values of u(r0) or u(r1) allow for positive affine transformations, as in the classical theory.
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Proof. For any r ∈ R, M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1, let Vr be a single reward
act at M , and Uw a standard act of weight w at ψ. By the Equivalence Lemma, the
definition
u(r) = sup{w : Uw 4
ψ Vr},
does not depend on the choice of ψ,M, Vr or Uw. By construction, we have Uw ≻ψ Vr
if w > u(r), and by the Dominance Lemma Uw ≺ψ Vr if w < u(r).
Suppose Uu(r) ≻
ψ Vr. Then u(r) 6= 0, or the Order on Rewards would give r0 ≻ r.
By Solution Continuity, U ≻ψ Vr for all U in a neighborhood of Uu(r). For w < u(r)
close enough to u(r), we can assume Uw is in this neighborhood (if necessary, using
Problem Continuity to get Uw as a perturbation of Uu(r)), contradicting Uw 4
ψ Vr .
By a similar argument it is not possible that Uu(r) ≺
ψ Vr. So Uu(r) ∼
ψ Vr, and by the
Equivalence Lemma this holds for any other choices of Vr , Uu(r) and ψ.
The Dominance Lemma and the Order on Rewards imply that
u(r) > u(s) ⇔ Uu(r) ≻
ψ Uu(s) ⇔ Vr ≻
ψ Vs ⇔ r ≻ s.
To prove unicity, let u˜ be any other function with the same properties. Then
Uu˜(r) ∼
ψ Vr ∼ψ Uu(r), and by the Dominance Lemma u˜(r) = u(r).
Remark 4. In his proof of the Born Rule Theorem [Wal12, p.188], Wallace uses Branch-
ing Availability and Reward Availability to get an act Ui,α in a neighborhood Ni of
another act Ui, with slightly different reward functions. Those axioms do give an act
with the desired reward function, but it might be nowhere close to Ui. To ensure it is
in Ni one must instead use Problem Continuity, as we did in the proof above.
Definition (Born Average Utility). The Born average utility of an act U at ψ is
BUψ(U) =
∑
r∈R
‖ΠrUψ‖2
‖ψ‖2
· u(r).
This is an average of the utilities of the rewards, weighted by the Born weights of Uψ
on them. In Wallace’s terminology, it is the expected utility EUψ(U), corresponding
classically to (6), but with Born weights in place of probabilities, as in Deutsch’s
proposal (3). As the term expected evoques its usual meaning as a probability-weighted
average, and at this point any link between Born weights and probabilities is yet to be
established, we adopt a more neutral terminology.
For standard acts, BU(Uw) = w. The next lemma shows any act is equivalent to a
standard act with the same Born average utility. It corresponds to step 3 in the proof
of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem.
Standard Act Lemma. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , U ∈ UM . Then U ∼ψ Uw, where Uw
is a standard act of weight w = BUψ(U) at ψ.
Proof. For each r ∈ R let {Mr,i} be a partition of ΠrOU in macrostates, and let
φr,i = ΠMr,iUψ. With Branching Availability and Reward Availability we can get
W ∈ UOU such that W |Mr,i is a standard act of weight u(r) at φr,i whenever φr,i 6= 0.
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Then ‖Πr1Wφr,i‖
2 = u(r)·‖φr,i‖2, and as by Irreversibility the Πr1Wφr,i’s are mutually
orthogonal, we have
‖Πr1WUψ‖
2 =
∑
r,i
‖Πr1Wφr,i‖
2
=
∑
r
u(r) · ‖ΠrUψ‖
2 = BUψ(U) · ‖ψ‖
2.
Hence WU is a standard act of weight BUψ(U) at ψ. The Utility Function Lemma
implies W |Mr,i∼
φr,i 1Mr,i , so Diachronic Consistency gives WU ∼
ψ U .
Finally, as preference on standard acts increases with their Born average utilities,
the same holds for all other acts. This is corresponds to the last step in the proof of
the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem, leading to its quantum equivalent.
Wallace Theorem. If ≻ψ is a Wallacean solution to a rich quantum decision problem,
then there is an utility function u on rewards that represents it via a Principle of
Maximization of Born Average Utility, i.e.
U ≻ψ V ⇔ BUψ(U) > BUψ(V ).
Proof. By the Standard Act Lemma, U and V are equivalent to standard acts of
weights BUψ(U) and BUψ(V ) at ψ, so the Dominance Lemma gives the result.
Wallace calls this the Born Rule Theorem. We avoid such name as its connection
with the Born Rule is not clear at this point. Granted, there is a parallel with the
classical Principle of Maximization of Expected Utility, except for the use of Born
weights instead of probabilities in the weighted average of utilities:
• Everettian agents decide using Born weights as parameters to measure the rele-
vance of sets of branches;
• Classical agents decide using probabilities as parameters to measure the relevance
of possible alternatives.
But to say that the first parameters acquire some meaning by comparison with the
second case would be precipitate. Not all relevance is probabilistic, if a teacher adopts
a weighted grade it does not mean he thinks one test is more likely to happen than
another. H.Greaves [Gre04, Gre07] has even suggested interpreting Born weights not
as probabilities, but as a caring measure that quantifies how much the agent should
care about each of his future selves.
And, as tempting as it may be to consider any illusion of chance in EQM in terms
of Savage’s subjective probabilities, we note that Born weights have objective values
imposed by the theory. And as our presentation shows, Wallace’s proof seems closer
to classical decision under risk than to Savage’s work.
So there is still a long way to go from this result to a probabilistic interpretation of
the Born weights. In [Wal12] Wallace goes to great lengths in an attempt to establish
such link. As such interpretation falls out of the scope of this article, this discussion
will be left for another one.
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6 Conclusion
From a purelly formal perspective, Wallace’s proof seems to be, for the most part,
correct. Still, a few problems were found:
• Null Disjunction seems incorrect, invalidating the Nullity Lemma. But the lemma
can be skipped if Diachronic Consistency is valid with our definition of nullity.
• The way Wallace suggests the Order on Rewards can be obtained does not seem
to work, requiring instead the Equivalence Lemma.
• The statements of Irreversibility and Erasure lacked important hypotheses.
• Some corrections were needed in the concepts of event and P-branching, and in
the axioms of Branching Availability and Erasure.
• A small problem in the proof of the Equivalence Lemma might require other
changes in Branching Availability e Erasure.
• Problem Continuity must be used to get Ui,α in Wallace’s demonstration of his
Born Rule Theorem, instead of Branching Availability and Reward Availability.
If all problems can be corrected, which seems plausible, the proof should be formally
valid. We have also identified some possible improvements:
• If all rewards are equivalent, Wallace’s result becomes so trivial that Born weights
lose their relevance. A new axiom was added to avoid this.
• Indolence and Continuation could be replaced by one simpler axiom.
• The statement of Macrostate Indifference does not seem to correspond to what
Wallace intended the axiom to be. Anyway, it is not needed for the proof.
• Diachronic Consistency could be replaced by a simpler axiom, as State Supervenience
implies part of it.
• The proof is simpler for finitely many rewards. For Wallace’s purpose, this should
not be a relevant loss of generality.
• Changing the order results are proven allowed some arguments to be simplified.
Our analysis also shows that the main ingredient for the proof is provided by the
Equivalence Lemma. It shows that, for quantum decisions, all that matters are the
Born weights in reward subspaces, just as classical lotteries are characterized by the
probabilities of rewards. So those weights, which did not seem to play any role in
Everettian Quantum Mechanics, end up being determinant factors in quantum decision
problems. Having this, the rest of the proof is just a quantum version of standard
arguments of decision theory.
Some questions still demand careful examination before Wallace’s proof can be seen
as solving the probability problem. For one, the result of a formal proof is only as good
as the axioms and concepts upon which it is based. Are they physically reasonable?
Can they really be seen as characterizing rationality for Everettian agents?
Another question is how to interpret the result. Are Born weights an Everettian
agent’s subjective probabilities? They have objective values, the agent is supposed to
know them, evolution is deterministic, and all branches exist. So there does not seem to
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be much room left for subjectivity or uncertainty. Despite this, can some probabilistic
meaning still be attributed to the Born weights?
Wallace and other authors have dedicated much thought to these questions, but
analyzing their arguments is a discussion beyond the aims of this article. Only after
such doubts are settled can the use of terms like rationality axioms, rational strategy,
Born Rule Theorem or expected utility be justified. Our preference for a more neutral
terminology, such as Wallacean solution, Wallace Theorem and Born average utility,
stems from the fact that much of the debate about these questions has been clouded
by the use of value-laden terms.
We hope our analysis of Wallace’s proof helps shed light on the principles and argu-
ments involved, and on what its result really means. This article is actually intended
as laying the groundwork for other papers dealing with those questions.
A Classical decision theory
Decision Theory [Kar14, Kre88, PI09] is an interdisciplinary area of study, concerned,
among other things, with developing principles to optimize decision making. Its prob-
lems are usually classified in 3 cases (the nomenclature varies in the literature): decision
under certainty, under risk, and under uncertainty.
A.1 Decision under certainty
This case involves choosing between alternatives with well known outcomes. Such
problems can be framed in terms of an agent, or decision maker, having to establish
a preference order on acts whose outcomes are certain (sometimes they are framed in
terms of lotteries with a single reward).
This preference is called rational if it is a total order, i.e. it satisfies Completeness
and Transitivity (see next section for definitions), so the choices can be ordered in a
single chain without loops. The reason for such label is that an agent whose preference
order is not total would be vulnerable to Dutch book arguments (loops in the order
could be exploited to “pump money” from him).
A.2 Decision under risk
In this kind of problem, each choice can have multiple outcomes, with known proba-
bilities. Such problems are usually framed in terms of an agent having to establish a
preference order ≻ on lotteries. A lottery
A = {(pi, ri)}i∈O (4)
consists of a set O of mutually exclusive outcomes, each having probability pi and
giving a reward ri (which can also be a penalty or any other consequence).
Each reward r is identified with a single reward lottery, giving it with certainty as
its unique reward. So an order on lotteries induces another on rewards.
Given lotteries A and B, and t ∈ [0, 1], a compound lottery tA + (1 − t)B is a
lottery in which the agent first chooses randomly A or B, with probabilities t and 1− t
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respectively, and then proceeds with the selected lottery. By classical probability rules,
it is equivalent to one in which the probability of each reward is tpA+(1− t)pB, where
pA and pB are its probabilities in A and B.
If all rewards are equally preferred, the problem is trivial. Otherwise, we assume14
the existence of least and most preferred rewards, denoted, respectively, by r0 and r1.
For each t ∈ [0, 1], we define a standard lottery of weight t as
Lt = tr1 + (1− t)r0. (5)
A crude strategy for problems of decision under risk is to let preferences follow
the expected value of lotteries, i.e. the average value of rewards, weighted by their
probabilities. This may seem reasonable, by the Law of Large Numbers, but can lead
to bad results, as in the St. Petersburg Paradox, if the number of runs is finite. A more
flexible strategy, proposed in 1738 by D.Bernoulli [Ber54], replaces monetary values
by an utility function u(r) on rewards:
Principle of Maximization of Expected Utility. Given an utility function u(r),
it induces a preference order on lotteries by A ≻ B ⇔ EU(A) > EU(B), where the
expected utility of A = {(pi, ri)}i∈O is
EU(A) =
∑
i∈O
pi · u(ri). (6)
An order ≻ on lotteries is induced (or represented) by a function u on rewards, via
this principle, if, and only if, the following conditions are satisfied, for any rewards r,
r′ and r′′:
• r ≻ r′ ⇔ u(r) > u(r′);
• if r′′ ∼ tr + (1 − t)r′ then u(r′′) = t · u(r) + (1− t) · u(r′).
The importance of this principle became clear in 1944, when Von Neumann and
Morgenstern [VNM44] proved that any preference order satisfying four reasonable con-
ditions can be represented by an utility function. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms are, for any lotteries A,B,C:
Completeness. Either A ≻ B, or B ≻ A, or A ∼ B.
Transitivity. If A < B and B < C then A < C.
Archimedean Property. If A ≻ B ≻ C, there are s, t ∈ (0, 1) such that tA + (1 −
t)C ≻ B ≻ sA+ (1− s)C.
Independence. If A ≻ B then tA+ (1 − t)C ≻ tB + (1 − t)C, for any t ∈ (0, 1].
Completeness and Transitivity correspond to the totality condition of decision under
certainty. The Archimedean Property implies no lottery is so incommensurately better
(resp. worse) than other, that it is impossible to reverse preferences by compound-
ing it appropriately with a worse (resp. better) one. It also means that sufficiently
small changes in a lottery do not alter significantly the order. Independence means a
preference between compound lotteries is based only on components that differ.
14This is just for simplicity, the theory can be adapted to work without such extremal rewards.
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The first three axioms ensure ≻ can be described by a correspondence between
lotteries and real numbers. With the last one, they also imply the following properties:
Substitutability. If A ∼ B then tA+ (1 − t)C ∼ tB + (1 − t)C, for any t ∈ [0, 1];
Monotonicity. If A ≻ B then tA+ (1− t)B is more preferable for higher values of t;
Continuity. If A ≻ B ≻ C there is a unique t ∈ (0, 1) such that B ∼ tA+ (1− t)C.
From them, we can get the following result, whose proof we sketch for comparison
with Wallace’s.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem. A preference order ≻ satisfies the Von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms if, and only if, there is an utility function u15 that
represents it via the Principle of Maximization of Expected Utility, i.e.
A ≻ B ⇔ EU(A) > EU(B).
Proof. It is easy to show that any ≻ represented by some u satisfies the axioms. The
converse has 4 steps:
1. By Monotonicity, preference on the standard lotteries Lt increases with t.
2. By Continuity, for any reward r there is a unique t ∈ [0, 1] such that r ∼ Lt, and
we set u(r) = t.
3. Given a lotteryA, each of its rewards r is equivalent to Lu(r). Hence Substitutability,
and the way classical probabilities combine, imply A is equivalent to LEU(A).
4. By steps 1 and 3, preference on lotteries increases with their expected utilities.
In decision under risk, a preference order satisfying the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms is also called rational. Implicit in such label is the idea that an intelligent
decision maker ought to follow the axioms. But empirical research shows that even
smart educated people often deviate from them, specially in cases with big rewards and
small probabilities (e.g. in the Allais paradox). Many authors dismiss this, arguing
that those agents, when confronted with their error, would recognize it and correct
their decision. Others, however, question the validity of the axioms, in particular the
Independence one.
A.3 Decision under uncertainty
In problems of decision under uncertainty there are multiple possible outcomes, but
their probabilities are unknown. Instead of lotteries, problems are usually framed in
terms of a preference order on acts which, depending on possible states of the world,
will lead to payoffs (consequences).
Some decision strategies (maximax, maximin, minimax regret, etc.) focus on best
or worst cases. These are useful in some situations, but can lead to absurd results
15Unique up to positive affine transformations u 7→ au+ b, for real constants a > 0 and b.
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in others, as they disregard important data, like non-extremal payoffs, or the low
likelihoods of some states of the world.
Another strategy uses subjective probabilities, estimates by the agent of the likeli-
hoods of states of the world. But the result can be very sensitive to the estimates used,
especially if there are unlikely states with huge payoffs. Despite this, L. Savage [Sav72]
proved, in 1954, that any preference order satisfying certain axioms can be induced,
via the Principle of Maximization of Expected Utility, by some utility function and
subjective probabilities.
Let S be the set of states of the world. Not all details of a state are relevant, so we
consider events, subsets of states with some common characteristic. For example, the
event E =“it rains tomorrow” consists of all states in which this happens. Events can
be partitioned into smaller ones, e.g. E could have subevents like “it rains tomorrow
and stock prices go up” and “it rains tomorrow and the result of a die is 3”. Events
can be combined through intersections, unions and complements, corresponding to the
logical operators AND, OR, and NOT.
An act is a function f : S → P , where P is the set of payoffs, so that f(s) = x
means x is the payoff resulting from act f if the state of world turns out to be s. Each
payoff x is identified with a single payoff act, which results x for all states. Given acts
f and g, and an event E, the compound act [E, f, g] is
[E, f, g](s) =
{
f(s) if s ∈ E,
g(s) if s /∈ E.
Savage adopts, for a preference order ≻ on acts, the following axioms16:
Axiom S1 (Order). ≻ is complete and transitive.
Axiom S2 (Sure-Thing Principle). For any event E and acts f, g, h and k, we
have [E, f, h] < [E, g, h]⇔ [E, f, k] < [E, g, k].
This is similar to Independence: preference between acts depends only on the events
where they differ. It allows us to define, for each event E, a conditional preference order
≻E by
f ≻E g if and only if [E, f, h] ≻ [E, g, h] for all h,
meaning “f is preferable to g given E”, i.e. if the agent assumes E will happen he will
prefer f to g.
An event E is null if f ∼E g for all f and g, i.e. the agent does not care about acts
on E (we will find the reason is he does not believe E can happen). Nullity has the
following properties, for events E and F :
Classical Null Subevent. If E is null, and F ⊂ E, then F is null.
Classical Null Disjunction. If E and F are null then E ∪ F is null.
They result from properties of sets and functions, like the fact that a function can
be redefined in a subset, without affecting the complement. We prove the last one, for
comparison with the quantum case.
16The order and names of the axioms vary in the literature. We adapted that of [Kar14].
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume E ∩ F = ∅. Given acts f, g and h,
define a new act k by
k(s) =


g(s) if s ∈ E,
f(s) if s ∈ F,
h(s) if s /∈ E ∪ F.
As E and F are null, [E ∪ F, f, h] ∼ k ∼ [E ∪ F, g, h].
Axiom S3 (Ordinal Event Independence). For any payoffs x and y, and any non
null event E, we have x ≻E y ⇔ x ≻ y.
Hence the agent’s preference order on payoffs is independent of any given event.
This is not as banal as it may seem: receiving an umbrella might be preferable than
sunglasses in the event of rain, but the preference might be reversed in a sunny day.
So this axiom demands a careful consideration of what we are to call acts and payoffs.
In this example, possession of umbrellas or sunglasses ought to be acts, with getting
wet or having protected eyes being payoffs.
Axiom S4 (Comparative Probability). Let x, y, z and w be payoffs, and E,F be
events. If x ≻ y and z ≻ w, then [E, x, y] ≻ [F, x, y] ⇔ [E, z, w] ≻ [F, z, w].
The intuitive idea is as follows. [E, x, y] gives a better payoff in case of E than
otherwise. [F, x, y] gives the same payoffs, but the event giving the better payoff is
F instead of E. By S3 (Ordinal Event Independence) the agent only cares about the
payoff and not how he got it, so the only reason for preferring [E, x, y] to [F, x, y] is
that he thinks E is more likely than F . So the same preference should hold for any
other pair z, w of better/worse payoffs.
This induces an order on events by
E ≻ F if and only if [E, x, y] ≻ [F, x, y] whenever x ≻ y.
It means the agent thinks E is more likely than F , as he prefers the better payoff be
given in case of E than in case of F . Savage proves this order is a qualitative probability
on events, i.e. it satisfies
(i) ≻ is complete and transitive;
(ii) E < ∅ for any E ⊂ S;
(iii) S ≻ ∅;
(iv) for any E,E′, F ⊂ S with E ∩ F = E′ ∩ F = ∅, E ≻ E′ ⇔ E ∪ F ≻ E′ ∪ F .
Actually, for this to work we need at least one pair of better/worse payoffs, given
by the next axiom.
Axiom S5 (Nondegeneracy). There are payoffs x, y such that x ≻ y.
If this axiom is violated, we have a trivial decision problem. In such case, most of
Savage’s Theorem is trivially true, but we do not obtain a unique subjective probability
measure (in fact, any probability measure would work).
The next axiom allows us to turn the qualitative probability into a quantitative
one.
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Axiom S6 (Small-Event Continuity). If f ≻ g then for any payoff x there is a
finite partition S = ·∪ni=1Ei such that [Ei, x, f ] ≻ g and f ≻ [Ei, x, g] for every i.
This is similar to the Archimedean Property. It means the set of states of the world
can be partitioned in events Ei deemed so unlikely that changing the payoff on one of
them is not enough to alter preferences. And no payoff is infinitely good or bad, or it
would alter preferences for any non null Ei. The partition could be given, for example,
by the results of roulettes with arbitrarily large numbers of slots, or by throwing dies
any number of times.
Whenever F ≻ E, the axiom implies there is a finite partition S = ·∪ni=1Ei such
that F ≻ E ∪ Ei for any i. Some Ei’s may be deemed more likely than others, but,
after some technical work, Savage obtains partitions whose events the agent considers
as equally likely as necessary.
Partitioning S into n events considered equally likely, we attribute to each a sub-
jective probability 1
n
. If, for a large n, the minimum number of these pieces needed to
cover some event E is m, its subjective probability should be close to m
n
. The exact
value is defined via a limiting process. In particular, an event is null if, and only if, its
subjective probability is 0.
One last axiom is needed for situations with infinitely many payoffs. It requires that
if f is preferred, given E, to all payoffs g can give in such event, then f is preferred to
g given E.
Axiom S7 (Dominance). If f ≻E g(s) for all s ∈ E, then f ≻E g (and likewise for
≺E).
Once we have the agent’s subjective probabilities, the problem becomes one of deci-
sion under risk. Savage’s result is similar to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem,
but with subjective probabilities.
Savage’s Theorem. A preference relation ≻ on acts satisfies axioms S1−S7 if, and
only if, there is an unique, nonatomic17, finitely additive probability measure pi on S,
and a bounded utility function u on P, such that ≻ is represented by u via the Principle
of Maximization of Expected Utility (with expected utilities defined in terms of the
subjective probability pi). Moreover, u is unique up to positive affine transformations,
and an event E is null if, and only if, pi(E) = 0.
Savage’s axioms are usually taken as mandates of rationality for decision under
uncertainty, even if they may appear less natural than those in the previous cases, and
even though intelligent people often violate them (e.g. in the Ellsberg paradox).
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